1 2	EXAMINING THE FILIBUSTER: THE FILIBUSTER TODAY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
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4 5	WEDNESDAY, MAY 19, 2010
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7 8	United States Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration,
9	Washington, D.C.
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12	The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in Room 301, Russell
13	Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Schumer, Chairman of the committee, presiding.
14	Present: Senators Schumer, Byrd, Durbin, Udall, Bennett, Alexander, and
15	Roberts.
16	Staff Present: Jean Parvin Bordewich, Staff Director; Jason Abel, Chief Counsel;
17	Veronica Gillespie, Elections Counsel; Adam Ambrogi, Counsel; Sonia Gill, Counsel; Julia
18	Richardson, Counsel; Lauryn Bruck, Professional Staff; Lynden Armstrong, Chief Clerk;
19	Matthew McGowan, Professional Staff; Justin Perkins, Staff Assistant; Mary Jones,
20	Republican Staff Director; Shaun Parkin, Republican Staff Director; Paul Vinovich,
21	Republican Chief Counsel; Michael Merrell, Republican Counsel; Trish Kent, Republican
22	Professional Staff; and Rachel Creviston, Republican Professional Staff.
23	OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCHUMER
24	Chairman Schumer. Our hearing will come to order, and I will begin with my
25	opening statement while we wait for Senator Klobuchar.
26	I want thank everyone for coming. I want to thank my good friend, Ranking

Member Bennett, who has been just an invaluable and fair member of this committee, not only under my Chairmanship, but long before it.

I also want to especially thank Senator Byrd for his continued interest and participation in these hearings. His dedication of leadership, his unsurpassed knowledge of the Senate Rules and procedures have benefitted us all and we are really very, very fortunate that he will be joining us later in the hearing. So I ask unanimous consent that when Senator Byrd arrives, he be permitted to read his opening statement without objection.

Now, we have here as one of our distinguished witnesses the former Senator from Oklahoma and Republican Whip, Don Nickles, a friend of both of ours. He served for 24 years admirably in this body. We welcome you, Senator Nickles, and thank you for having your time with us.

Second, there is no former living Senator who can give us more insight into the evolution of the filibuster and the cloture rule than our first witness, who we are so honored to have, and that is former Vice President and former Senator Walter Mondale.

As everyone knows, he was 42nd Vice President of the United States. He served two terms in the Senate representing Minnesota.

In early 1975, Senator Mondale, together with Senator Byrd, successfully led the bipartisan debate which resulted in amending Senate Rule 22, the cloture rule, to reduce the number of Senators needed to invoke cloture. The Senate first determined it could change its own rules by a simple majority, and voted three times to set that

precedent. Reaction to that precedent, which was later rescinded, resulted in a compromise. The Senate agreed to move from two-thirds of the Senators present and voting to the current 60-vote threshold for cloture that still exists, as we all know, today.

In 1977, Mr. Mondale, as Vice President, serving also as President of the Senate, and Majority Leader Robert Byrd played a crucial role in shutting down the post-cloture filibuster of a natural gas deregulation bill. This action became the main catalyst for efforts in 1979 to limit post-cloture debate time.

There is a great deal of debate between those who believe that under the Constitution, a majority of the Senate can change its rules and those who disagree.

Today, we will see a glimpse of the Senate at a time when it did face and vote on that very issue, and it is very important to look at it because it hadn't happened before.

This is the second in a series of hearings by this committee to examine the filibuster. The purpose is to listen and learn so that we can later consider whether the Senate should make any changes in its rules and procedures, and if so, which ones. I have not settled on nor ruled out any course of action myself, but as Chairman of the Rules Committee, I believe we need to fully and fairly assess where the Senate is today and whether we can make it better.

One thing is certain, however. In recent years, the escalating use of the filibuster has drastically changed the way the Senate works. Our first hearing on April 22 explored the history of the filibuster. We now focus on the filibuster today and its consequences for the Senate, for all three branches of government, and ultimately for

the American people.

We learned in our first hearing that the use of filibusters has reached unprecedented levels. The chart to my right, prepared from facts supplied by the Congressional Research Service, shows that the use of cloture motions has escalated rapidly in recent Congresses. Cloture motion counts are useful because they represent a response to filibuster tactics, actual filibusters, threats, or realistic expectations of them.

During the first period which you see here, from 1917 to 1971, there was an average of 1.1 cloture motions filed per year. The next period is from 1971 to 1993, where there was an average of 21 filibusters per year. In the period from 1993 to 2007, that number increased by almost a third to an average of 37 cloture motions per year. And then we come to the 110th and the beginning of the 111th Congress. We are now averaging more than 70 cloture motions per year. That is an average of two per week when we are in session.

Before I call on the rest of my colleagues for their statements, I want to highlight a few statistics about where we stand with our legislative, executive, judicial branches, and the filibuster. In the legislative branch, not every bill that passes the House could or should pass the Senate. But as we know, members of the House have been complaining regularly and rapidly, at least on our side of the aisle, that its bills stall out in the Senate, and the numbers indicate there is some truth to that. According to the statistics maintained by the Senate Library, there have been 400 bills passed by the

House in this Congress that have not been considered by the Senate. Of those, 184 passed by voice vote. Another 149 passed with the majority of House Republicans voting yes on a roll call vote, indicating a high degree of bipartisan support, at least for those over 300 bills.

The filibuster is also creating problems for the executive branch. For example, for fiscal year 2010, half of all non-defense spending, \$290 billion, was appropriated without legal authority because Congress hadn't reauthorized the programs. Dozens of Presidential appointments are also being delayed or blocked from floor consideration. Many of these were approved unanimously by both Democrats and Republicans in committee and are stuck on the executive calendar because of holds. That means executive agencies don't have the leadership and expertise to do their jobs well. Key national priorities are also being undermined. Even nominees to important national security positions are unreasonably delayed by holds and filibuster threats in this Congress. This is dangerous at a time when we need a Federal Government using all its resources to fight terrorism and protect our country.

And finally, there is the judicial branch. Today, 102 Federal judgeships are vacant, a problem which has consequences for Americans from all walks of life, direct or, more likely, indirect. President Obama has submitted nominations to fill 41 of those. More than half, 24, have been reported out of the Judiciary Committee yet languish on the calendar. Of those, 20 were approved by the Judiciary Committee with bipartisan, often unanimous, support. What is holding them up? Too often, it is the

threat of a filibuster by one or a few Senators. It is true that the Senate increasingly scrutinizes judicial nominations. I myself opposed some of President Bush's nominations to the bench. However, at this point in George Bush's Presidency, the Democratic minority Senate had confirmed 52 Federal circuit and district court judges, but today, the Senate has approved only 20 of President Obama's, even when candidates have strong bipartisan committee support. So without enough judges to staff the Federal judiciary, businesses and individuals alike may feel pushed to give up or settle rather than wait years for their day in court.

These are but a few examples of the consequences of the filibuster. So I hope today's hearings help inform members of this committee, the Senate, and the public at large about the use of the filibuster and how it affects our government and our nation today.

I look forward to listening to our witnesses, and now I am going to turn over the podium, of course, to, again, a man for whom I have the utmost respect as both a Senator and as a person, Robert Bennett.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BENNETT

Senator Bennett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your chart. Maybe you want to leave it up there, because I am going to have a comment or two.

131 Chairman Schumer. Great.

Senator Bennett. I appreciate your holding this series of hearings and the opportunity to offer some introductory remarks. The majority has chosen to focus on what it believes to be the abuse of the filibuster by the minority, but these hearings have also revealed how the Majority Leader can abuse the rules of the Senate to limit debate and amendment.

At our first hearing, we saw how the leadership tactic of filling the tree to prevent consideration of amendments really works, and you referred to the Congressional Research Service, Mr. Chairman. We went there, as well, and they have a report to which I will be referring that talks about how the Majority Leader can use the tactic of filling the tree in order to avoid allowing the minority to offer amendments, and we go back 25 years, that is to 1985, when the Majority Leader was Bob Dole and document the number of times that the Majority Leader, from Dole to Byrd to Mitchell to Dole to Lott to Daschle to Frist to Reid have used this tactic. We have studied the abuses of the Senate rules by the majority, that is, the use of Senate Rule 14 to bypass regular order and avoid committee consideration, and the decreasing time between the introduction of a matter and the filing of a cloture petition.

Here are some of the statistics, and we go back to the numbers you show on your chart. During the 109th Congress, Rule 14 was used a total of 11 times. In the 110th Congress, that number grew to 30. CRS reveals that since January of 2007, the majority has filed cloture the same day that the matter was offered to the Senate, so that cloture was filed prematurely. Before there was even any threat of a filibuster, a

cloture petition that would end up in that large bar that is at the end of your chart was filed before the minority had even an opportunity to make any comment.

Here is the pattern. The current Majority Leader has used this tactic at a rate more than double that of his predecessor and five times as often as the last five Majority Leaders combined. So you have all of that building up to the time where now we have a situation where either Rule 14 or the filing of a cloture petition and filling the tree occurs immediately in order to make sure the minority does not have any opportunity to offer any amendments.

This has gone unnoticed by the media. I am interested to track the media.

They were very, very much opposed to filibuster when the Republicans were in charge, very much defending it as a tool of truth and wisdom once the Democrats got in charge--or the other way around, depending on which side of the media--

Chairman Schumer. No, no, no. You were right the first time.

166	Senator Bennett. Okay. Whichever it might be. And so these hearings are
167	very valuable to let us look at this thing and I appreciate very much the willingness of
168	Vice President Mondale and Senator Nickles to come give us their views on this matter
169	and look forward to hearing what they have to say.
170	Chairman Schumer. Thank you. All I would say, and I emphasized this at our
171	first hearing, this is notthere is plenty of blame to go around, if it is blame. Systems
172	changed because of the actions of both parties, and the actions seem to switch when
173	each party is in the minority or the majority. And the question is, for the good of the
174	Senate over a longer period of time, should we change anything. But you are certainly
175	right to bring up what you bring up, Senator Bennett, and I think it should contribute
176	constructively to the debate.
177	Senator Bennett. Thank you. I ask unanimous consent that the CRS
178	memoranda to which I referred be made a part of the record.
179	[The information of Senator Bennett submitted for the record]
180	Chairman Schumer. Without objection.
181	Usually, I like to let everybody give opening statements, but we have the Vice
182	President and Senator Nickles waiting. What is your pleasure, Senators Alexander and
183	Roberts? Do you want to make a couple of brief remarks?
184	Senator Alexander. How about one minute?
185	Chairman Schumer. Great. Whatever you need.

Senator Alexander. I don't know if Senator Roberts can speak for one minute.

Senator Roberts. Well, I plan to, as usual, shine the light of truth into darkness.

That may take a minute and a half.

[Laughter.]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALEXANDER

Senator Alexander. Mr. Chairman and Senator Bennett, thank you for the hearing and we look forward to hearing the former Vice President and colleagues and Senator Nickles.

I would only say two things. One is, it is interesting to me how the Chairman defines a filibuster. A filibuster by his definition is anytime the majority seeks to cut off debate or to stop the minority from offering amendments. In Senator Nickles's testimony, he points out that between January 2007 and April 2010, cloture was filed 141 times on the same day a matter, measure, or motion was brought to the Senate floor. So the Senate is supposed to be defined by the capacity for virtually unlimited debate or unlimited amendment, so if you count filibusters by saying these bad Republicans who happen now to be in the minority have filibustered, the definition of a filibuster is any time we try to shut the Republicans up.

Well, that happened when the Republicans were in charge, and I can vividly remember Senator Byrd's words to me in our first class, and he will be here to speak for himself. He said, sometimes, the minority may be right.

And as we reflect back upon the time when President Bush was here and the Republicans were in charge of the Congress, maybe our Democratic friends would think

that maybe they were right about privatizing Social Security. They used the filibuster
to prevent President Bush and the Republican Party from privatizing Social Security.

They might say that the country is better off after the great recession because they used
the filibuster. Maybe they were right. They slowed down and prevented a whole
number of other important measures, from tort reform to the appointment of
conservative judges. Maybe they were right.

So I think we should not define filibuster by the number of times the majority

So I think we should not define filibuster by the number of times the majority seeks to cut off debate, and I think we ought to recognize Senator Byrd's advice that sometimes the minority may be right.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Schumer. Senator Roberts?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERTS

Senator Roberts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the last hearing, we detailed--and thank you for your leadership on this--the marked decline on open amendment rules in the House and the soaring increase in the closed amendment rules for legislation brought up before that body. To whom can the American people turn when the House majority runs roughshod over the minority and the wishes of the public? That is the Senate. The Framers of the Constitution certainly intended that.

There is a temptation, I think, on the part of some members in this chamber to make the Senate more like the House, to do away with the procedures and the

precedents intended to foster compromise and comity.

Since 2007, there has been an unprecedented rise in the parliamentary tactics by the majority to circumvent what we call regular order, and that data is indisputable. I encourage anyone interested in the subject to witness the trend over the last three-and-a-half years that is characterized by an increase in the Rule use of 14 to bypass committees, a decrease in the use of conference committees to resolve legislation, and a drastic rise in the use by the Majority Leader of a tactic called filling the tree, which prevents the minority from offering amendments. The use of filling the tree is more than double that of the previous leader and exponentially greater than the norm of the last decade.

I think these trends are alarm bells. Some critics charge the minority with obstruction and point to the number of cloture motions filed in the last three-and-a-half years as evidence of, quote, filibustering. The use of cloture, which is an instrument to cut off debate, does not really correlate with objections from the minority. A great many cloture motions, far more than in any previous Congress, are filed the moment the question is raised on the floor. Thus, debate is cut off before it can even begin.

Worse yet, there seems to be a growing inclination intentionally to conflate the term filibuster with holds. Everybody knows holds are an informal process by which a Senator submits notice that they object to a unanimous consent request. Typically, a hold is used to prevent a nomination or a piece of legislation from passing the chamber without debate or a recorded vote. A hold does not prohibit the Majority Leader from

bringing a question to the floor.

I would like to reiterate in closing--over my two minutes, I apologize to the Vice

President and to Senator Nickles--the framers of the Constitution had the foresight to

create an institution that was based not on majority rule, but where each State,

regardless of size, had two Senators to speak out on their behalf, to debate, and to offer

amendments. For anyone who doubts that this is what the Framers intended, I

encourage them to revisit the Federalist Papers Number 10, attributed to James

Madison. He states, "Complaints are everywhere heard that the public good is

disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties and that measures are too often decided not

according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minority party, but by the superior

force of an interested and overbearing majority," and that is true whether it is

Republicans or Democrats.

Mr. Chairman, the filibuster is an indispensable tool for controlling the effects of partisanship and factionalism because it compels the majority, regardless of party, to meet the minority and the American people in the center in order to forge a national policy that is based on consensus instead of discord. When Don Nickles came up to shake my hand, who has been a longtime friend, he said, what is happening? And I said, this place is broken. Help.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much, and I apologize to the gentlemen who are waiting patiently.

Chairman Schumer. I think your concluding lines would find favor with the

majority of Senators, whatever our diagnosis is, and that is the reason we are having these hearings.

Senator Durbin, our Democratic Floor Leader?

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN

Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see the Vice President and I thank all of you who are here to testify today.

I am completing a book now which is a biography of Mike Mansfield and his tenure as the Majority Leader and there was an interesting early chapter there in 1963, when there was a debate in the Senate over the Satellite Communications Act and Wayne Morse initiated a filibuster against the Satellite Communications Act. It became a celebrated cause because the Democratic majority was split. The Southern Democrats, who had argued you should never cut off debate, because they didn't want to go to the civil rights votes, were in a quandary because they wanted to move to the satellite bill and it meant that they had to cut off debate, vote cloture against Wayne Morse's filibuster on the satellite bill.

Ultimately, they made the decision to go forward and over 70 Senators voted for cloture to stop the filibuster by Wayne Morse. That is an interesting footnote, but the closing sentence was, I thought, the most memorable part. It was the fifth time in the history of the Senate there had ever been a motion for cloture, 1963, the fifth time.

And so this institution which we are a part of and which respects the rights of minorities within the institution has functioned throughout its history respectful of

minorities, but has not gone to the extremes we have now reached where we are now using the cloture motions and filibusters as commonplace. So we have gone beyond deliberation to somewhere near deadlock. For some, that complements their political philosophy. They don't want the Senate to do anything, and I guess that is an approach that can be served by this use of the rules. But I don't think it serves our purpose in society at large or our purpose in this nation, where we are expected to deliberate but to decide.

In the last six weeks, I can tell you what our business has been. We spent one entire week in the Senate debating on whether we would extend unemployment compensation by four weeks. We spent the next week in the Senate debating five nominees, all of whom passed with more than 60 votes. So there clearly was very little controversy associated with them. And now we are on our fourth week on the Wall Street reform bill, which we hope to invoke cloture on this afternoon. At this pace, there are so many major issues facing this nation and the Senate that cannot be considered. I think it is part of a strategy. Unfortunately, the rules complement that strategy and benefit that strategy.

Now, I have been on the other side of this argument, as well. I was a whip when we were in the minority position with 45 votes and I needed to find 41, when necessary, to stop cloture. So I know that you have to look at this from both sides of the perspective.

But I do believe that we have reached a point now where the American people

are losing faith in this institution and I don't think, whatever our purpose may be, that if that is the ultimate result, that we are serving our democracy. We have got to find a reasonable way to respect the minority but to stop what I think is clearly a destined gridlock for this great institution.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Durbin.

And now, I will ask unanimous consent that my introductory remarks be added to the record, because we have someone far better at introducing the Vice President.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Schumer submitted for the record]

Chairman Schumer. So we would ask Senator Klobuchar and, of course, Vice

President Mondale to take their seats at the table. Senator Klobuchar?

INTRODUCTION OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE BY HON. AMY KLOBUCHAR, A UNITED

STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Senator Klobuchar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, Senator Nickles.

It is such an honor to be here to introduce the Vice President. As you can imagine, he is revered in our State, and you should know that my first job in Washington was as an intern, and my first assignment as his intern was to do a furniture inventory of all of the Vice President's furniture as well as his staff's. It was a project that took two weeks. I wrote down the serial numbers of every piece of furniture, and I can tell you that I tell students, take your internship seriously, since that was my first job in

Washington and this was my second job in Washington.

[Laughter.]

Senator Klobuchar. I will also tell the members of the committee that nothing was missing--

[Laughter.]

Senator Klobuchar. --so you have a very honorable witness here with you.

You think about the Vice President's career and everything he has done, the crusading Attorney General in Minnesota, a leader in the United States Senate, a Vice President who really defined the role of the modern Vice President, the Ambassador to Japan. When I was there recently, they referred to him in Japanese, which I will not attempt, as "The Big Man," he was so respected when he was in Japan. And he made that very courageous decision when Paul Wellstone tragically died to have to take up the mantle for our party with only a week remaining in the election. And while he was not successful, he handled it, as he has done everything in his life, with such civility and such dignity.

One part of his biography that is often overlooked that you will hear about today is when he was in the Senate, frustrated with the lack of getting things done, as Senator Durbin so eloquently spoke about, and decided to take on the power structure. It is really an amazing story, and he was, in fact, successful—maybe not successful enough, as we see where we are right now, but at that time, he made a major change, and so I am sure he will enlighten the committee with his stories and knowledge, and it is my honor

to introduce the Vice President.

Chairman Schumer. Vice President, your entire statement will be added to the record, and you may proceed as you wish.

STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER F. MONDALE, DORSEY AND WHITNEY LLP,

MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Mr. Mondale. Thank you, Senator Klobuchar, for your kindness in introducing me today. We are very proud of Amy in Minnesota, and from what I understand, the nation shares that pride today, and I am honored that she would be present with me at the commencement of this hearing.

Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to the committee for conducting these hearings on the need to reform the rules to protect debate and deliberation, so central to the unique role of the U.S. Senate, while removing flaws in the procedures that experience has proven fuel obstruction and paralysis.

Perhaps I was asked to testify because of my involvement in the successful bipartisan battle to reform Rule 22 in the 94th Congress, where we reduced the number of members required to invoke cloture from a maximum of 67 to 60. At about the same time, led by Senator Byrd, we changed the post-cloture rules so that at a time certain following cloture, the Senate would have to vote on the underlying measure, because we were developing at that time a post-cloture filibuster technique which led to endless delay.

My cosponsor, Jim Pearson from Kansas, a Republican, and I called up our

proposal at the very opening of Congress. Our strategy was based on the constitutional right of the Senate to propound its own rules by a majority vote. Vice President Rockefeller, ruling from the Chair, supported our position. The Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, a wonderful human being and leader, appealed the Chair's initial ruling, an appeal we then successfully moved to table on a non-debatable motion.

In that long and sometimes bitter fight--I think we were on the floor for a month or more--the Senate on three separate occasions voted to sustain the constitutional option, the principle that a majority vote could change the rules. After the sense of the Senate became clear, Mike Mansfield and Bob Byrd, also with Russell Long, working with the Republican leadership, reached the negotiated compromise that I just outlined, and those are basically the rules that govern the Senate today.

As we completed that process, an argument occurred about whether the Senate, in reaching the compromise rules, erased the effect of the majority-vote motions to table that I referred to earlier. I think Senator Cranston said it best when he said, "Upholding the [eventually successful]Mansfield point of order only adds one tree to a jungle of precedents we reside in. But above and beyond that jungle stands the Constitution, and no precedent can reverse the fact that the Constitution supercedes the rules of the Senate that the constitutional right to make its rules cannot be challenged."

At about the same time, Senator Byrd, who was the key leader in these rules reforms, said that at any time that 51 Senators are determined to change the rule and

have a friendly presiding officer, and if the leadership joins them, that rule can be changed and Senators can be faced with majority cloture.

That constitutional precedent remains today. Some argue that the rules themselves require a two-thirds vote for any amendment, but as I said earlier, I think the Constitution answers that question: a determined majority can change the rules.

We took that bold step in 1975 to reduce the cloture requirement because we had become paralyzed. We were in a ditch in the Senate and many of us saw an abuse of the rules. Jim Allen of Alabama was a rules wizard. He had a coterie of allies who began the march toward what we see today, the use of cloture to paralyze the Senate, preventing it from acting on any issue that a motivated minority might seek to block. The constitutional remedy was invoked by majority rule in 1975, and the compromise was adopted by a large bipartisan vote.

While the circumstances then differ in detail from what you confront today, fundamentally, what we see now is the logical extension of the paralysis we faced then. The Senate, in fact, has evolved into a super-majority legislative body. The ever-present threat of filibuster has greatly enhanced the ability of a single Senator, simply through a hold on a nominee or a measure, to prevent any consideration and to do so secretly. Many members of the Senate have said that this body is in crisis. Many scholars have said that the crisis is more severe than it has ever been before.

I am heartened to see, particularly among newer members of the Senate, and I hope in the Senate at large, that there is a growing demand for rules reform, and I hope

these rules will be ready for adoption at least by the beginning of the next session.

Let me just mention two suggestions that I have. One, weaken the power of holds by making a motion to proceed either non-debatable or debatable for a limited number of time, say, two hours. This change has been suggested many times over the years, but today's Senate demonstrates how badly it is needed. The rules should provide that the consideration of any nominee or the debate on any measure can begin —begin, not end-by a traditional motion to proceed requiring only a majority vote.

Secondly, I would hope that the joint leadership could shape a reformed Rule 22, as we did in 1975, that would reduce the number of Senators required for cloture from the present 60 to, say, somewhere between 58 and 55. There is no magic number.

You will notice I do not want to get rid of the filibuster, but as I will argue, I think we need a different number.

Then, we tried to find the line that would assure deliberation and prevent debilitation. The number 60 worked for us then, but in this harshly partisan Senate of today, I believe it is a hill too high. However, it would worry me to reduce the cloture requirement all the way down to a simple majority to end debate. It might be more efficient, but the Senate has a much higher calling. It must ventilate tough issues. It must protect the integrity of our courts. You must shape the fundamental compromises reflecting our Federal system. And at times of great passion, you must help us find our way, lead us forward, and hold us together.

I served in the Senate during the most perilous times of executive abuse, when

wars were begun and escalated, when funds were spent or withheld, when civil liberties and civil rights were under assault - all with little public awareness; and no accountability to the legislative branch - and it was only when basically here in the Senate that Senators stood up and used their special stature that we began to make a change. And that is why I don't want to get rid of the filibuster entirely.

Ironically, however, the use of that right as now practiced threatens the credibility of the Senate and its procedures and, I think, adds to the incivility that we discuss. The filibuster should not be used to frustrate the very purpose of the Senate procedures, to foster discussion, even extended discussion, to enhance public understanding.

The constitutional authority to advise and consent found in the Senate for Presidential nominations is one of the Senate's most important responsibilities. Yet there can be no consent without debate and there can be no debate if a minority of Senators, even a single Senator, can bar the Senate from giving its consent. Under the same constitutional provisions that give the Senate the power to change Rule 22 by majority vote, it can change its procedures for bringing nominations to the floor.

The Senate's leadership should have the authority, sustained by a majority and a ruling of the presiding officer, if necessary, to bring nominations to the Senate. In addition, the Senate's leadership has the ability to suspend until a particular nomination has been resolved the two-track system that has permitted more filibusters, in effect if not in name.

One of the things we did back in 1975, in addition to reducing the number required for cloture, was to institute the two-track system. So the old idea that if you wanted to filibuster, you had to get on the floor and make a spectacle of yourself, "Mr. Smith Goes to Washington," and the whole nation and the world can see what you were doing had been replaced by a more subtle, silent filibuster that allowed for more efficiency in getting the huge backlog of Senate business conducted, but it had a negative side effect because it reduced almost all public attention and public responsibility for instituting filibusters and now the holds that, in my opinion, are based upon the filibuster.

I am going to submit the rest of my testimony for the record, but let me just close with one statement. When the restored Old Senate Chambers were dedicated here some years ago, I think Howard Baker was selected to speak at those ceremonies for the Republicans and Tom Eagleton was selected to speak for the Democrats. And Senator Eagleton pointed out the unique and even sacred role that the Senate has in sustaining the values and the laws and the unity of our country.

He said, "Here in this room has been sheltered the structural side of our democratic government for decades. The government's life force, what makes it work and endure, is our capacity to accommodate differences and to find a way beyond parochial, partisan, and ideological concerns to live together as a free nation." I think that is the Senate's unique role, and that is why the work of this committee and the decisions of the Senate on how it will conduct itself are so crucial to our future. Thank

vou.

101	you.
482	[The prepared statement of Mr. Mondale submitted for the record]
483	Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. That was outstanding
484	testimony. You described better than I have heard in a paragraph why people don't
485	stand up and debate the way they did when Jimmy Stewart, which is a question all of
486	our constituents ask us all the time.
487	Now, we have a little bit of time issues here. Senator Nickles, I believe you
488	have to leave by 11:15. If you wouldn't mind, Mr. Vice President, because I know you
489	were going to stayno, stay where you are, if you don't mindmaybe we can have, with
490	the committee's permission, Senator Nickles do his testimony, and then we will ask
491	them questions together. Is that okay with everybody?
492	Thanks. Okay, so let me introduce Senator Nickles briefly. Well, we all know
493	Senator Nickles. He was an outstanding leader here for 24 years, Republican Whip,
494	and played a major role in many different pieces of legislation. It is very kind of you to
495	come and give us your views. Without objection, your entire testimony will be read in
496	the record and you can proceed as you wish.
497	STATEMENT OF HON. DON NICKLES, CHAIRMAN AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, THE
498	NICKLES GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.
499	Mr. Nickles. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and I appreciate your
500	accommodation. I think the world of the Senate. I spent 24 years in this institution.

I love the Senate. I even served on this committee for a short period of time, and I

think, as Senator Durbin, you called it a great institution. It is a great institution. I was with Senator Cochran this morning and he called it a very special place, and it is a very special place.

I sometimes participated in indoctrinating new Senators, or newly-elected Senators, and I would usually tell them, the Senate is special for a couple of reasons, but amongst legislative bodies, it is really special because unlike the House and unlike most parliament procedures, members of the Senate have unlimited debate and unlimited opportunities to offer amendments. Sometimes the rules curtail that, and I kind of shudder when that happens because that infringes on what really distinguishes the Senate as being such a unique body.

So rules of the Senate, and I heard Senator Mondale talk about the abuse of the rules, but the abuse of the rules can go both ways. And certainly if the rules are used to abort debate, not shut down debate, but just eliminate debate or eliminate amendments, I find that offensive to the traditions of the Senate. Some of the proposals that some people are talking about really would alter the Senate in a way that makes the Senate much more like the House of Representatives, and that would be a serious, serious error.

I know many of you had the pleasure of serving in the House as well as the Senate. I did not. But I really beg you not to turn the Senate into a legislative body that is very comparable to the House. Granted, you can do a lot of things. You can do a lot of things very quickly. You can do a lot of things with very limited debate and

with the majority vote. That is not the Senate that I served in for 24 years and it is not the tradition of the Senate and it wouldn't be good for the country. It wouldn't be good for the legislative process, either.

Our forefathers showed great wisdom and our leaders in the past, including

Senator Mondale and others that have worked to develop the rules, and the rules aren't perfect, but they can be abused. I think cloture, by its very nature is somewhat abusing the process. It is being used way too much and there are way too many, quote, "filibusters," but I would really question what is a filibuster. I can only remember a few filibusters in my career.

I do remember laying on a cot at night just off the Senate floor when we are going on and on and on shortly before Christmas, having other members talking about cussing those--not talking about cussing, they were cussing members of the Senate who were keeping us here so close to Christmas--it probably sounds familiar to what you all were hearing this past Christmas season--because I was involved in it. That was over a nickel-a-gallon gasoline tax, I think, in 1982, and it was very contentious.

But we didn't have many filibusters in that period of time. This growing explosion of filing cloture--cloture, the whole idea was to limit debate and limit amendments, but unfortunately, now, cloture is being used to shut off debate and shut off clotures. There is a big difference. And when cloture is used to shut off debate and shut off amendments prematurely, that is wrong. There is a right way to legislate and a wrong way to legislate, and if you are curtailing individual Senators' ability to offer

amendments prematurely--and I say prematurely, and that is a judgment call.

I know the bill that is on the floor of the Senate--and I was working with Senator Durbin, I wanted to see his amendment--I was worried, would this get in before cloture was filed. And I am sure that there are hundreds of amendments that are pending right now that many members and other people are saying, boy, I hope that gets in before cloture is filed because it is going to knock our amendment off, and that will probably be a determining factor whether you get cloture.

But I compliment Senator Dodd and I compliment Senator Reid. At least you had the bill on the floor and it was debated. It was amended. Democrats and Republicans did get to offer amendments. That is a healthy change. We used to do that all the time. We used to have authorization bills on the floor, subject to amendments, so Democrats and Republicans could offer a lot of amendments before cloture would come down. And now, cloture is being pulled--I call it a quick-draw cloture. It is being filed way to quick, way too often.

A couple of other comments I will make that are the same thing, and I have heard both Senator Alexander and Senator Roberts and Senator Bennett mention, and that is Rule 14(b), bypassing the committee process. And I am well aware of the fact that we did it at times when Republicans were in control. But it is happening on an accelerating basis. The rate that that is happening now is accelerating.

What does that mean? It means we don't go through committee markup.

That means the bill is usually written in the Leader's office. Well, I was in leadership

for 14 years. I had my hands on a lot of pieces of legislation that we were involved in.

But bypassing the committee, in my opinion, is a mistake. Committees in general usually have bipartisan markups where members are able to massage and legislate.

I think the health care bill that Senator Baucus marked up with Senator Grassley, they had hundreds of amendments. That was done well in committee. It wasn't done well afterwards, in my opinion. Then it went to the Leader's office. That is not the Senate working its will. Bypassing the committee process is dangerous. The same thing, whether there is energy legislation. When you have major pieces of legislation, it is very important it go through the committee process, let all members on the committee who have experience and expertise be able to amend it, to massage it, to work on it, as well as on the floor.

And the same thing would apply to filling the tree. And again, I know

Republicans did it, but I know it is also happening on a much more rapid pace today.

That is a serious mistake. That is a serious infringement on a Senator's ability to be able to offer amendments and to be able to debate. And I think when we did it, looking back, I think we made a mistake.

So any time that the Senate by the use of rules, filling the tree, bypassing committee or filling cloture prematurely and denying Senators the opportunity to debate or amend, in my opinion, curtails the Senate from being the great tradition, the great legislative body, the great deliberative body which is so crucial to passing positive, good, bipartisan legislation.

Lowering the threshold required for cloture, in my opinion, as well, would be a mistake, because that is a threshold that almost by definition requires bipartisan involvement. It requires some cooperation. You lower that, you increase the tendency or the likelihood for basically the dominant party at the time to steamroll, and that, in my opinion, is not good for the process and it is not good for the American people.

I think the rules can be adjusted, but maybe adjusted more by--maybe I will take an example, Senator Mondale's comments when you talk about maybe changing the time on motion to proceed. For the most part, we didn't have filibusters on motions to proceed in the past and you shouldn't in the future. Just having an agreement with the majority and minority to say, we won't filibuster the motion to proceed as long as you give us ample time to debate and amend. And as long as that understanding is there, we won't filibuster the motion to proceed. You could eliminate lots of those cloture petitions. You could save two or three days on debating a motion to proceed and actually be amending a bill and make real progress. That is just a suggestion.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nickles submitted for the record]

Chairman Schumer. Well, thank you, and I think just putting your testimony and Vice President Mondale's next to one another is great because it shows that there are some different points of view, but there is a need to fix the system and some areas where we can agree. There is often difference in interpretation as to what is causing

all of these problems, but as I just said to Senator Bennett, maybe there is a way we can come up with a bipartisan way to fix things, that deals with both sides' legitimate complaints.

The first question I have is for--and I know Senator Udall just got here late. He has been instrumental, by the way, in having these hearings and leading them and he wants to give an opening statement. Because of our time constraints, what I would like to do is just give you some extra time when your question period occurs, if that is okay.

Senator Udall. That would be great, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman Schumer. Okay. My first question is to Senator Mondale--Vice President-slash-Senator-slash-great American Mondale. The nub of this debate, not in terms of how to fix it but whether we even can fix it, is the contrast of the Constitution, the Article I, the Senate 'shall make its own rules,' versus the rule that is now in place in terms of having a majority of the Senate be elected before you can change the rules, two-thirds, and you mentioned what Senator Cranston said. Was there much debate back in 1975 about the contrast of those two positions? Could you just elaborate a little more, because that is going to be the nub of the issue if we should attempt to change anything. Even if, say, Senator Bennett and I were to agree on what changes could occur, another Member who wouldn't agree could still force us back into that conundrum.

Mr. Mondale. Yes, there was- intense debate. One of the key elements of the

debate was between our position that the Constitution conferred upon the Senate the ability to change its rules by a majority vote, at least at the opening of the session - so I read the rule as not limited to that, but that is why I say "at least" - and some of the opponents who said everything is controlled by Rule 22 as inherited and it can only be amended under those rules, the Senate is a continuing body, and the other arguments that you have all heard again and again.

So that issue was totally vented. That was the issue contained in the motion to table, which we tabled, and our argument was, as Senator Cranston put it so well, as Bob Byrd pointed out during this debate, that a majority of the Senate with a cooperating presiding officer and leader could invoke majority cloture on its own. In other words, the constitutional power was there. That was very much at the heart of the debate.

We argued that if the Framers wanted the Senate to have a higher voting requirement to change the rules, it would have provided it, because in five or six places in the Constitution, such as confirmation, treaty ratification, and some other measures, it provides specifically that two-thirds of the Senate are required. So we think there are a lot of strong arguments for the majority vote principle that we made and sustained in that debate.

Chairman Schumer. Would you want to comment on that, Senator Nickles?

Mr. Nickles. Just a couple of comments. One, I served--since I have been in town, leadership has changed in the Senate six times. With Senator Mondale, in that

649	period, the Democrats controlled both Houses for decades. And now you have much
650	more volatile leadership changes, and I can tell you, if you read past comments from
651	Democrats and Republicans, their vantage point and viewpoint changes whether they
652	are in the majority or the minority.
653	Chairman Schumer. Absolutely.
654	Mr. Nickles. Long-term, I think 60 is a very good number and I would hate to
655	think the Senate would reduce that number. And Senator Alexander alluded to it.
656	President Bush had control of both Houses. If the Senate would have moved to a
657	majority number, say 51, there was no limit what could have been passed.
658	The Senate having a higher number, having 60and I like 60. I think maybe 67
659	might have been too high. Sixty is a pretty good number. It makes the majority work
660	with the minority and
661	Chairman Schumer. But do you think we could change it based on the
662	Constitution?
663	Mr. Nickles. No, I am not
664	Chairman Schumer. Should we want to?
665	Mr. Nickles. Well, one, I think it would be a disastrous mistake
666	Chairman Schumer. Right.
667	Mr. Nicklesa disastrous mistake for the Senate if you want the Senate to be
668	a deliberative body, if you want the Senate to be different from the House.

Chairman Schumer. Right.

Mr. Nickles. If you want a majority body where 51 individuals can ram things through, that is not the Senate I know and love.

Chairman Schumer. I am not asking about 60. I mean, let us just take the motion to proceed. Do you think the Senate could change that rule by a majority vote? Let us say Senator Bennett and I agreed that was the right thing to do in exchange for you not being able to fill the tree in certain ways.

Mr. Nickles. I think--

Chairman Schumer. Do you think we could do that?

678 Senator Bennett. I would stipulate that that agreement is hypothetical.

[Laughter.]

Mr. Nickles. I think what would be much preferable, instead of changing the rules, would be to have basically a caucus agreement, Democrats and Republicans saying, we are not going to filibuster motions to proceed. In exchange, we expect time and amendment opportunities. Don't shut us out. Don't fill the tree. Let us legislate like we should. I think you can do that with a handshake without amending the rules.

We are a continuous body. The rules do continue into the next time. I know if you went into January and said, oh, under the Constitution, we are going to rewrite the rules, somebody would say, the existing rules are still in existence. The officers of the Senate are still in existence. And so to do that, you are going to have to have 60 votes to get there, or 67, actually--

691 Chairman Schumer. Sixty-seven.

692 Mr. Nickles. --67 to amend the rules. I would prefer, instead of amending the 693 rules, I would urge you not to get in that battle.

One, I would expect, even predict, that the viewpoint is going to change after

November, what threshold you would want. I would just encourage you--like I said, it

has changed six times since I have been up here. It will change again. Sixty is a good
number. It works.

And people say the Senate doesn't work. Senator Roberts said the Senate is broken. There are a lot of things that are broken about the Senate, but you don't have to change the rules of the Senate to fix it. A lot of it could be done--Harry Reid--I was Republican Whip and Harry Reid was Democrat Whip for six years. We got along very well. We never had a problem, never had a problem. And I can't help but think leadership working together, maybe the whole caucuses working together, saying, wait a minute. This is getting carried away.

One Senator shouldn't be able to place holds on people forever. And people think holds stop all these nominations. No. All it does is say, I wish to be consulted. Consult him to say, now we are bringing up the nominee, and if you want to block the nominee, get prepared to speak because we are going to stay on the nominee until we are finished. People have a right to be notified. The Senate operates a lot on unanimous consent. Individual Senators have the right to be notified before you bring up the nominee or the bill so I can participate in the debate. That makes sense. But

they don't have a blanket right to stop everybody indefinitely forever.

So the hold, the perception of the hold, I think, has been greatly blown out of proportion. I hope that we don't get in the tradition of filibustering judicial nominees.

That came up in the last few years. I think that was a mistake. I mean, the tradition was, we had big debates over Judge Bork and Judge Thomas and really not so much on--on some nominees, but we still allowed a majority vote and I am glad that we did.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you.

Senator Bennett? I mean, there are so many questions, but we want to move on here. This is such very good testimony.

Senator Bennett. Thank you very much, and thanks to both of you for your insightful comments.

I, as a relatively new member of this body at the time, remember a situation where President Clinton sent up a nominee that some members of our conference didn't like. We didn't have enough votes at the time, even though we were in the majority, we didn't have enough votes to defeat the nominee because there were some Republicans that would go with the Democrats and the nominee would get 51 votes.

And the question came up, well, let us filibuster. We have got 41 who are opposed.

Let us filibuster. Senator Lott, the Majority Leader, said, absolutely not. The tradition in the Senate is you do not filibuster judges. And my colleague from Utah, Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, said the Leader is absolutely correct.

Under no circumstances do we filibuster judges. And so some of the others who were

making this case said, oh, all right.

And making your point, Senator Nickles, Senator Hatch said, the time will come when we will have a President, and if we filibuster their judge with their President, they will then have the precedent to filibuster our President's proposal for judgeship. And when Miguel Estrada came before the Senate and Senator Daschle, as is his right under the rules, changed the precedent, we saw a sea change in the way things were done around here.

And that was the point at which I discovered that precedents trump the rules. Precedents are easy to change when they are different than the rules, but the precedent that you don't filibuster judges got changed, and now, Mr. Chairman, you have heard the exchange on the floor. When a Republican was going to filibuster a Democratic judge proposed by President Obama and some of our Democratic colleagues started quoting back to us our own statements that we said, no, you don't filibuster judges, Senator McConnell, as the Leader, said, I made that statement, I believe that statement, but you changed the rules and we are now operating under your rules.

I don't know quite how we rewrite some of the rules to fit some of the precedent of comity that we had, but that is the problem we are facing. Under the rule, you can, indeed, file a cloture petition the same day the bill comes down and you can fill the tree immediately.

And I remember Senator Byrd doing that as Chairman of the Appropriations

Committee on the first supplemental bill when I got here brand new as a freshman Senator, and the Republicans raised a huge outcry about how unfair that was and backed him down, not with votes, but simply the strength of their argument. And I remember very clearly--you remember the things when you are a freshman Senator--when Senator Byrd more or less apologized to the Republicans and said, no, we will allow amendments. We will allow this to happen. And he backed away from it and the filled tree--I wasn't smart enough to know how they did it under the rules, but the filled tree somehow went away and we went ahead with this.

So even in the relatively brief time I have been here, I have seen a sea change as we have moved from the kind of circumstance you describe, Senator Nickles, where people sit down and work it out on the basis of precedent and comity behind the scene, to a situation where the rule is taken to the extreme, and once it is, whichever party does it, then enables the other party to do it back when the control in the Senate changes.

I have no questions for you, just that comment, listening to the two of you and your experience and then adding my own experience, that we should be very, very careful as we proceed in these waters because we can mess things up pretty badly, and even under the present rule, if we are not careful.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nickles. Senator Bennett, if I could just make one comment, a lot of this could change if you had several Senators on both sides who said, you know what? I am

always going to protect your right to offer amendments if you will always protect my right to offer amendments. If you have enough Senators do that, then cloture is not invoked the first time or two. There was even a tradition when I was first elected that some Senators wouldn't vote for cloture the first time or two, just because on that very principle. They always thought we should have maybe a little more debate and a little more amendments. And if you had more debate and more amendments, a lot of the hostilities and partisan fever goes away. People get pent up.

I am not aware of how many amendments are pending or are going to be shut off on the financial bill, but I know there are a lot. But at least the bill has been on the floor and it has had some amendments. I love seeing authorization bills, and as a former Senator, I loved having an authorization bill on the floor subject to amendment. And I, frankly, even liked the idea that we didn't have a germaneness requirement. So you could be on a bill and offer something totally out of the ballpark, even have a little fun that way. And it is all right to have a little fun. You should have some fun. And you can express yourself that way instead of being so bottled up and so restricted that you never get a chance to offer your amendment. That increases the partisan tensions dramatically.

Chairman Schumer. I know you have to go, Senator Nickles, but we thank you for your testimony.

- 794 Mr. Nickles. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
- 795 Chairman Schumer. Thank you for being here.

796	We are going to continue the questioning with the Vice President, and Senator
797	Udall, you can make an opening statement as well as ask some questions.
798	Senator Udall. Senator Nickles, is it 11:15 you have to leave?
799	Chairman Schumer. Yes.
800	Senator Udall. Because you have two minutes here. I would just like to
801	Mr. Nickles. Absolutely.
802	Senator Udall. Senator Schumer asked you the question about the
803	constitutional option, and you are a lawyer, is that correct?
804	Mr. Nickles. No.
805	Senator Udall. Oh, you are not? Okay. Okay. Well, then no wonder you
806	evaded the question, then.
807	[Laughter.]
808	Mr. Nickles. I would think
809	Senator Udall. But do you have an opinion? I mean, he basically was asking,
810	you know, he gave a hypothetical and Senator Bennett said he wouldn't stipulate to it,
811	but the problem we have today that you are describing, and you said it very well, you
812	said several times there are way too many filibusters. That is your quote. The
813	filibuster is being used too many times. I mean, that is what we are seeing over and
814	over again.
815	To change that, the key is, as Vice President Mondale said, to be able to move
816	with 51 votes and be able to do it as a majority under the Constitution. Do you have

817	an opinion on that? The Constitution says in Article I, Section 5, each House may
818	determine the rules of its proceedings, and the vote by 51 votes at the beginning of a
819	Congress. Do you have an opinion on that?
820	Mr. Nickles. Yes. I think it would be a disaster if you did it.
821	Senator Udall. Well, no, but can you do it?
822	Mr. Nickles. Well, one, you still are operating the rules underit is a continuous
823	body. You don't have 100 percent of the Senate
824	Senator Udall. Well, your answer is then no, I think.
825	Mr. Nickles. That would be correct.
826	Senator Udall. Yes. Okay. I understand the continuous body
827	Mr. Nickles. I could give you a longer answer
828	Senator Udall. No, no. I don't need a longer answer
829	[Laughter.]
830	Senator Udallbecause it is 11:15.
831	[Laughter.]
832	Mr. Nickles. I appreciate it.
833	Senator Udall. I wanted to try to see if I could get an answer from you directly,
834	and I understand the continuousnot to cut you off and not to be impolite in any way.
835	I want to let you leave at 11:15, as you agreed.
836	Mr. Nickles. I appreciate it. Thank you.

Senator Udall. Thank you.

Thank you, Chairman Schumer, very much. Before I ask the Vice President a couple of questions, I just want to say a few things. To me, today's hearing is not about examining the current use of the filibuster, but the abuse of the filibuster. We would not need to examine the filibuster if it were used sparingly and judiciously, as Senator Nickles talked about. Unfortunately, both parties in recent years have shown their willingness to use it as a tool of obstruction rather than a means to extend debate.

One of the main reasons I ran for the Senate is because I saw the world's greatest deliberative body turning into a graveyard of good ideas. After over a year of observing this body in action, or in many cases lack of action, it is clear that we are in danger of becoming just that.

Last month, this committee held its first hearing on the filibuster. It focused on the evolution of the filibuster throughout the history of the Senate. At that hearing, several of my senior colleagues on the other side of the aisle spoke about the need to preserve the filibuster in its current form. They argued that it is embedded in the Senate's tradition of unlimited debate, that any attempt to reform it is simply a short-sighted power grab by a frustrated majority.

But I believe my colleagues are missing the point. I had been speaking for months about reforming the Senate rules, not just the filibuster, to make this a better institution. I am not approaching this effort with disrespect for this body's traditions. I hope that by reforming our rules, we can restore some of the collegiality and

bipartisanship that our Founders intended for the Senate.

And let me make clear, I don't necessarily think that the current three-fifths requirement to achieve cloture is wrong. What is wrong is that only three current members of the Senate, Senator Byrd, Senator Inouye, and Senator Leahy, have had the opportunity to vote on Rule 22, which was last changed in 1975. What is truly wrong with our rules is that they have become entrenched against change, something our Founders never intended.

I am very happy, Vice President Mondale, to see you here today because you were one of the leaders of filibuster reform back in 1975, and I know you believe, as I do, that each Senate has the constitutional right to change its rules by a majority vote, and you state that very clearly in your testimony.

The Senate of 1975 thought that the filibuster was being abused, but the more recent Senates have demonstrated a whole new level of destruction, with Senators from both sides of the aisle increasingly using it as a weapon of partisan warfare. It is time to reform our rules, and as I have said many times, I will hold this view whether I am a member of the majority or the minority. There are many great traditions in this body that should be kept and respected, but stubbornly clinging to ineffective and unproductive procedures should not be one of them.

Now, Vice President Mondale--

Chairman Schumer. Great, and thank you, and now you may ask your question.

Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Vice President Mondale, you heard Senator Nickles talk about the idea that any change in the filibuster is going to dramatically change the Senate, that the Senate is going to become like the House, and we heard this in our last hearing. Several critics of filibuster reform have stated that if the Senate changed the cloture rule, changed it in any way, it would make the Senate no different than the House of Representatives.

As a former member of this body, how would you respond to that assertion in terms of your experience that you went through and what you observe today with regard to the Senate?

Mr. Mondale. I don't want the Senate to become the House. I want it to be the unique body that it has always been.

Senator Udall. And I agree with you on that.

Mr. Mondale. When we adopted these rules in 1975 reducing the number needed for cloture, what we heard from the opposition was just that, that you are going to change the Senate away from what it has been, and now today what I am hearing is 60 is just about right. Well, that is a transformation in viewpoint from what we heard back then.

The rules have changed since the beginning of this Senate. At first, there was no filibustering going on. Then they went to the--it was just move the previous question. Then there were several decades where there was no way of closing off debate. And then in the middle of World War I, when Wilson couldn't get the Senate to even supply materials to fight the war, he gave a bitter speech and the Senate bent

and adopted the two-thirds rule.

And then it came to our time and we were paralyzed. We couldn't get anything done unless everyone agreed to it. And so we changed the rule with a broad cross-section of support. Because of the rulings of Vice President Rockefeller, we changed the rules to what they are now, and I think that worked for us. It worked for us in those times. But what we have now is a harsh partisanship that scholars - I know they are going to testify later here - say that the situation now is, in terms of abuse of power, in terms of paralysis, is worse and different than it has ever been, and I believe that is true.

The number of filibusters that were cited in the charts shown before, the use of holds, which we haven't yet discussed today, it has been done before, but the pervasiveness of the strategy of holds now holds up hundreds of nominations. The government can't get going. On any number of measures, often the holds are submitted secretly. There are rolling holds, all kinds of holds now. And the net effect is that a few are able through secrecy to block the Senate from action without any public accountability, and they are able to do that because just behind that hold is the threat of a filibuster. And the leader knows he can't make any progress.

So I think that we need to adjust the rules, not to become the House, but to become a restored, effective Senate with the power to deliberate so we can do our jobs and do them better.

Senator Udall. Thank you very much. You said we haven't talked enough

about holds. I mean, one of the results of holds, and you know this, observing us currently, I believe it was the Washington Post reported that after the first year, the Obama administration had been in office for a year, they only had 55 percent--

Mr. Mondale. Right.

Senator Udall. --of their appointees in place. So basically you have the hold process holding up the administration from getting its team in place. That wasn't what was ever envisioned, I think, by our Founders or by the Constitution. It has been completely abused.

What would you suggest in terms of if you were going to make a rule change about holds, specifically? Could you talk to us a little bit about that?

Mr. Mondale. Yes. What I said in my testimony was that I think the Leader ought to be able to move to proceed, and it should be done with a majority vote, maybe with a certain time limit for the debate. But it shouldn't be, in effect, filibuster. And I am talking about how you get the measure up for consideration. I am not talking about how it is finally resolved. The regular rules would apply to that.

Senator Udall. Yes.

Mr. Mondale. Many times we have seen on these holds that they are held up, and then when it finally gets to a filibuster vote or a final vote on the nominee, they pass 98-to-two or something like that. So it was apparently a false issue.

941 Senator Udall. Thank you very much, and thank you for allowing me to run a 942 little bit over there--

943	Chairman Schumer. It was well worth it.
944	Senator Udallactually with his answer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
945	Chairman Schumer. Senator Alexander?

Senator Alexander. Just to put all this in historical context, the Vice President's last example was exactly what happened to me in the spring of 1991 when Senator Metzenbaum held my nomination as Education Secretary up for three months and then finally I was confirmed at midnight by unanimous consent, you know, after I had waited around for about four months. I told the story at the earlier hearing, I went to see Warren Rudman and said, what do I do about this? He said, "Keep your mouth shut. You have no cards." And he told me the story of how Senator Durkin had held him up and he would withdraw his name and run against Durkin and beat him in 1976. So there is not so much new about these holds.

Mr. Vice President, this has been very helpful to have you here. Senator Udall was talking about his impressions as a new Senator. Mine was shock at the filibustering of Judge Pryor, who had clerked for Judge Wisdom in New Orleans, for whom I had clerked, Judge Pickering, who had been a civil rights advocate in Mississippi when it was unpopular, Miguel Estrada, and Priscilla Owen. Do you think it was wrong for the Democratic minority to filibuster President Bush's judicial nominees when he was President?

Mr. Mondale. What we are getting at here is whether we are all taking situational, tactical positions on the rules – that is using them when it serves our purposes and opposing it when it doesn't.

Senator Alexander. Right.

Mr. Mondale. My view is you have to live by these rules. They were

bipartisan. We put them in place. I hope they can be bipartisan if there are any changes now. And I don't see anything in the rules that says that you can't filibuster a nominee as well as a regular measure.

Senator Alexander. Thank you for that. There had been a precedent, of course, of not doing that. Justice Scalia--well, we won't go into all of that, but it was a big, big change. And when we Republicans, and I was one really on the other side of this issue with the Gang of 14 movement, when many Republicans tried to change the rules and assert the argument you are now making, the constitutional argument, Senator Reid said it would be the nuclear option. It would be the end of the Senate as we know it and it was going to be Armageddon.

Let me go back to my earlier point about the hold that Senator Metzenbaum put on me. You mentioned Senator Allen.

Mr. Mondale. Yes.

Senator Alexander. And you remember when you were first elected, Senator Williams from Delaware, who would sit on the front row and had this high voice. We have always had, at least in my experience here of watching the Senate and serving in it, individual Senators who have exercised these rules, and we have them today.

I mean, if you will remember in the 1980s, Senator Byrd and Senator Baker operated the Senate on the sort of handshake that Senator Nickles talked about. They had these, I guess you would call them broad agreements on every bill that came up, that we would bring up the X bill, the financial regulation bill, and we will have 35

amendments on it, or 36, 18 here and 18 here, and then we will vote, and that is how almost all business was done. Of course, it can't be done if one Senator objects, which may be the reason we don't have that kind of thing today.

So I am going to ask you a question and this will be my last one. It seems to me that changing the 60 would only make less likely bipartisanship, because when the Democrats have had 60 in the last year and a half, they paid no attention to the Republicans and they have just jammed their own legislation through, in my judgment. When they get fewer, they will have to pay attention to us, or we are in the majority and you have fewer, we will have to pay attention to you, and that produces compromise and bipartisanship, I believe.

But maybe there is a different way to deal with the question of the individual Senator who puts on too many holds or holds up things for too long without changing the 60. I mean, is there a solution for a Senator who the rest of the Senators think is taking advantage of the rules and making it impossible for the Senate to operate under the kind of broad agreements that Senator Byrd and Senator Baker once used to manage the flow of the Senate?

Mr. Mondale. I think one of the things that many Senators have tried to do is make these holds public so the holder must explain to his colleagues and to his constituents why he is doing it. As you know, there is a rule here now that if you put on a hold for longer than six days, the name will be disclosed, and so now there is a strategy for rolling the hold so that every fifth day, the name of the holder changes. So

it has frustrated the disclosure. If there would be some way to guarantee public disclosure immediately, that might help.

But there is nothing in the rules about holds. There has never been a Senate decision. But it is now not a minor problem, it is a pervasive problem, and every leader, Republican leader and Democratic leader, has at one time in his career stood up and lamented what holds have done to his ability to conduct a sensible Senate. I think we need to deal with holds, because it is now a much bigger problem and it is a growing problem because it works, it is secret, it is effortless, and it is, I think, very destructive of the purposes of the Senate.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Vice President.

Senator Alexander. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Alexander.

Now, we had asked unanimous consent at the beginning of this hearing that when Senator Byrd arrived if he could make his opening statement. I don't believe he will ask questions. So with everyone's permission, he has been waiting for a couple of minutes, I would like to call on Senator Byrd to make his opening statement.

Senator Roberts will ask questions and you will be on your way, but it has been really helpful for you to be here today.

[Pause.]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you for being here, Senator Byrd. I think I join everyone here - Senators, Vice President Mondale, and the audience - in really thanking

Senator Byrd for going out of his way to be here.

Senator, your name has come up on many, many occasions in this hearing and how you were so instrumental in what happened and in forging the compromise in 1975 and in many other ways. We are honored you are here. I know it will be a token, not just to the attendees here but to this committee and the whole Senate, of how important you think this subject is. So thank you, and the floor is yours.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BYRD

Senator Byrd. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, in his 1789 journal, Senator William Maclay wrote, and I quote, "I gave my opinion in plain language that the confidence of the people was departing from us owing to our unreasonable delays. The design of the Virginians and of the South Carolina gentlemen was to talk away the time, so that we could not get the bill passed."

Our Founding Fathers intended the Senate to be a continuing body that allows for open and unlimited debate and the protection of minority rights.

Senators have understood this since the Senate first convened. James Madison recorded that the ends to be served by the Senate were, "first, to protect the people against their rulers, secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led." A necessary fence against such danger would be the United States Senate.

The right to filibuster anchors this necessary fence. But it is not a right intended to be abused.

During this 111th Congress, in particular, the minority has threatened to filibuster almost every matter proposed for Senate consideration. I find this tactic contrary to every Senator's duty to act in good faith.

I share the profound frustration of my constituents and colleagues as we confront this situation. The challenges before our nation are too grave, too numerous, for the Senate to be rendered impotent to address them, and yet be derided for inaction by those causing the delays.

There are many suggestions as to what we should do. I know what we must not do.

We must never, ever, ever tear down the only wall, the necessary fence, that this nation has against the excesses of the executive branch and the resultant haste and tyranny of the majority.

The path to solving our problem lies in thoroughly understanding the problem.

Does the difficulty reside in the construction of our rules, or does it reside in the ease of circumventing them?

A true filibuster is a fight, not a threat, not a bluff. For most of the Senate's history, Senators motivated to extend debate had to hold the floor as long as they were physically able. The Senate was either persuaded by the strength of their arguments or unconvinced by either their commitment or their stamina. True filibusters were, therefore, less frequent, and more commonly discouraged, due to every Senator's understanding that such undertakings required grueling, grueling personal sacrifice,

exhausting preparation, and a willingness to be criticized for disrupting the nation's business.

Now, unbelievably, just the whisper of opposition brings the "world's greatest deliberative body" to a grinding halt. Why is that? Because this once highly respected institution has become overwhelmingly consumed by a fixation with money and media.

Gone, gone are the days when Senators Richard Russell and Lyndon Johnson, and Speaker Sam Rayburn gathered routinely for working weekends and couldn't wait to get back to their chambers on Monday morning.

Now, every Senator spends hours every day throughout the year and every year raising funds for reelection and appearing before cameras and microphones. Now, the Senate works three-day weeks, with frequent and extended recess periods.

Forceful confrontation to a threat to filibuster is undoubtedly the antidote to the malady. Most recently, Senate Majority Leader Reid announced that the Senate would stay in session around the clock to bring financial reform legislation before the Senate.

As preparations were made and the cots were rolled out, a deal was struck and the threat of filibuster was withdrawn.

I strongly commend the Majority Leader for this progress, and I strongly caution my colleagues, as some propose to alter the rules to severely limit the ability of a minority to conduct a filibuster. I know what it is to be Majority Leader and wake up on a Wednesday morning in November, and find yourself a minority leader.

1093 [Laughter.]

Senator Byrd. I also know that current Senate rules provide the means to break a filibuster. I employed them myself in 1977 to end the post-cloture filibuster on natural gas deregulation legislation. This was the roughest filibuster I have experienced during my more than 50 years in the Senate.

In 1987, I successfully used Rules 7 and 8 to make a non-debatable motion to proceed during the morning hour. No leader has attempted this technique since, but this procedure could be and it should be used.

Over the years, I have proposed a variety of improvements to Senate rules to achieve a more sensible balance allowing the majority to function while still protecting minority rights. I have supported eliminating debate on the motion to proceed to a matter (except for changes to the Senate rules), or limiting debate to a reasonable time on such motions, with Senators retaining the right to unlimited debate on the matter once it was before the Senate. I have authored several other proposals in the past, and I look forward to our committee work ahead as we carefully examine other suggested changes. The committee must, however, jealously guard against efforts to change or reinterpret the Senate rules by a simple majority, by circumventing Rule 22, where a two-thirds majority is required.

As I said before, the Senate has been the last fortress of minority rights and freedom of speech in this republic for more than two centuries. I pray that Senators will pause and reflect long before ignoring that history and tradition.

1114	Chairman Schumer. Well, thank you so much, Senator Byrd. First, I think for
1115	all of us, we are privileged to be here and hear your testimony. Anyone who is sitting
1116	here knows why Senator Byrd is revered in the Senate just by listening to him for the
1117	last 15 minutes, where in his own inimitable style, he made powerful, practical, and
1118	traditional arguments. I don't think need permission, and I am going to take the liberty
1119	of distributing your remarks to every member of the Senate.
1120	Senator Byrd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much.
1121	Mr. Mondale. Mr. Chairman?
1122	Chairman Schumer. Vice President, please.
1123	Mr. Mondale. It was my privilege to serve with Senator Byrd when he was
1124	Minority and Majority Leader, to be Vice President presiding when we had some fairly
1125	rigorous tests of the rules
1126	Senator Byrd. You bet.
1127	[Laughter.]
1128	Mr. Mondale and I came to deeply admire his understanding and his
1129	statesmanlike approach to these rules. Most of the rules that did reform the Senate,
1130	he himself wrote. They are the Byrd Rules, and it is an honor to hear from the Senator
1131	again today.
1132	Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. It is really one of those

1134 Thank you, Senator Byrd. Thank you so much.

moments in the Senate, I think, that many of us will just not forget.

1133

1135	Senator Byrd.	Thank you.	Thank you, Mr. Chairman.	I thank the committee
1136	and I thank the Vice Pi	resident.		

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator. That was great.

I just want to say, as Senator Byrd leaves, that we forget the traditions of the Senate in this rushed, sometimes partisan, angry world, and he brings us right back to it.

This really was, in my opinion, and I think and hope I am not--I don't think I am overstating it, sort of a hallowed moment.

Senator Roberts, you may resume questioning of Vice President Mondale.

Senator Roberts. That is a pretty tough act to follow, to say the least. I recall when we first went to Great Britain on an interparliamentary exchange led by Ted

Stevens, thinking that he could work things out better on the Appropriations Committee with Senator Byrd if we took him over to Great Britain, and I can't remember which Brit gave the opening speech, but it indicated that he wanted to welcome those of us from the colonies who obviously did not understand all of the intricacies of the mother country, but that we were certainly welcome. I leaned over to the British fellow to my left and said, he will regret those remarks for the rest of his life--

[Laughter.]

Senator Roberts. --because it was Senator Byrd who responded and then instructed all those present on the reign of virtually every King of England--and queen, and the politics behind it.

1155 [Laughter.]

1156	Senator Roberts.	Two hours later, the guy sitting next to me said, "I say, is he
1157	going to continue through every one of them?"	

1158 [Laughter.]

Senator Roberts. And I said, yes, he is, and he did.

1160 [Laughter.]

Senator Roberts. That was signature Bob Byrd, who also enthralled us during the entire trip with a lot of other stories.

Tom indicated that he was worried as a new Senator about coming to the graveyard of good ideas. Some feel--actually, I feel there is a growing number that might say that some of these ideas are bad ideas that deserve a decent burial. I think it is very important to pass legislation. I think that is probably why we are created, the House, the Senate. But it is just as important to prevent bad legislation from passing.

I kept telling Max Baucus and Chuck Grassley on the Finance Committee, Mr.

Vice President, that we ought to have a flashing light, "Do no harm," every time we considered a myriad of amendments that obviously not many people knew a lot about, with the exception of our Chairman.

At any rate, I stand in admiration of Senator Byrd and his fierce, fierce fight for the rights of the minority, and also in regards to the executive branch. I think the elephant in the room here as to why we have so many problems, or challenges, really, I don't want to call them problems, is that the executive branch obviously has a tremendous agenda. I don't know whether to compare it to the New Deal or the Great

Society or whatever has been said by the knowing pundits that will testify here, but my goodness, I cannot think of any endeavor that affects any person's interest in the country that has not been touched by legislative efforts under the banner of change.

I think if you looked at the primaries, and we have the expert on primaries here to my right, who is a dear, dear friend, but I think that there has been an obvious reaction with regards to debt and spending and government takeovers and jobs and terrorist policy, et cetera, et cetera. And I say that because I think that that is the push, and Senator Byrd mentioned the executive that is coming down the pike and it is a lot like a fire hose. If it isn't legislative, it is done by Executive Order and you read about it on page 11 of some newspaper, if you read newspapers anymore, and it is a pretty shocking kind of thing to you. You say, oh, wait a minute. I would like to grab onto that and get it back to committee, but we don't go to committee anymore.

We bypass committees, and I think that is one of the things that Senator Nickles brought up and I am sure the Vice President agrees. You have got to go to committees, where the expertise is, and then hopefully avoid the appropriators trying to change it and then reach some accommodation and that is how it worked. But that is not how it is working now, because we are leapfrogging the committees on very, very important ideas that Tom has mentioned over there in his comments.

I want to talk about holds just a minute. I put holds on people. I don't like it at all. When I do so, I do it publicly. But I was stuck with a situation where there were many reports, and I believed that they had legs, where we were going to transfer

those in Gitmo up to Fort Leavenworth where we had the Command and Staff School, and it is the intellectual center of the Army. That is where General Petraeus wrote the doctrine that is in evidence today with Afghanistan, hopefully that will be successful.

We have inside-out security, but we don't have outside-in, and I thought the suggestion was ludicrous. I tried with the White House, with the Department of Defense, with the National Security Council, with DOD, even the CIA, to figure out, is this really going to happen? Is there any possibility of this happening? And then finally I couldn't get any assurance, so I just put a--I said, I want assurance from the White House that this is not going to happen, and so I put a hold on the Secretary of the Army, who happened to be a very good friend of mine, a Republican Congressman replacing Pete Sessions, who was also a very good friend of mine.

At any rate, he called me and he said, "Why do you have a hold on me?" And I said, well, you are a great friend. I just thought I would pick you out and give you a little publicity. And he said, "Well, what is the problem?" I said, I don't have any problem with you, John. It is just I am trying to get an answer from somebody to indicate to me where we are in regards to moving incarcerated terrorists to Leavenworth, Kansas.

Well, I finally got what I needed, and I can't talk about it because it was all confidential, and right now, that whole policy, I think, is sitting over there at the Justice Department somewhere being decided. But that was a case where I thought at least a hold was justified. I am not talking about holds that will last forever to hold up the

progress of the Senate. That did hold up the situation with the Secretary of the Army.

I know the head of DOD, Mr. Gates, who is from Kansas, certainly let me know how he felt about it.

I have always felt, I would tell the Chairman, that I didn't want any amendment that I would like to offer up to be debated on the floor of the Senate. I didn't even want it debated in the committee. I thought if I didn't have enough merit in the amendment to talk to somebody on the other side, regardless of who is in power on the committee, to put it in the Manager's Amendment or just agree by unanimous consent, that I probably didn't have too much business offering the amendment, and I certainly didn't want a vote on the Senate floor, where a vote could go the other way and then that puts it in cement and then you have lost the issue. I know there are those Senators who would rather have the debate and lose than they would make any progress with the amendment. So that is just my school of thought.

I think we do reach agreements, as Senator Nickles has indicated, when the rubber meets the road. We did during impeachment. We all met in the Old Senate Chamber and individuals came together and we worked a way out of a very difficult situation.

I don't know when we are going to meet like that again to reach some kind of accommodation with what we have facing us, which I say is a very ambitious agenda in a Senate and a country that is very Balkanized in regards to the response to all of that. I suspect it will come finally during the time of entitlement reform, which we must tackle,

1240	and our economic situation, and I think we are just going to have to sit down and say, all
1241	right, we have to do this regardless of the press, as the Senator has indicated, or
1242	elections or anything else. We will have no alternative. And I hope that would be
1243	rather a gloomy prospect if that is the only thing that can really bring us together. But
1244	I would hope that we could do what Senator Nickles has pointed out and also what the
1245	Vice President has pointed out.
1246	I am way over time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
1247	Chairman Schumer. Thank you. It is always a pleasure to listen to Senator
1248	Roberts. He didn't talk about each King of England, but he had a lot of wisdom in what
1249	he had to say.
1250	[Laughter.]
1251	Chairman Schumer. Vice President, thank you so much.
1252	Mr. Mondale. Thank you.
1253	Chairman Schumer. As Tom Udall went out, his hat was off to you and how you

1255 Mr. Mondale. Thank you.

have really helped us in this debate.

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Chairman Schumer. So your generous donation, in a sense, of your time, but more importantly of your thinking, is going to help us, and certainly I will be continuing to consult you as we move forward here.

1259 Mr. Mondale. Thank you very much.

1260 Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Vice President. Thank you.

L261	Let us call our next panel, and I appreciate their understanding. I am going to
L262	give brief introductions because we are running a little late. We have a great panel
L263	here and let me just quickly do the introductions of our two witnesses.
L264	Steven Smith is a Professor of Social Sciences at Washington University and
L265	Director of the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy
L266	there. He is the author of several books on the U.S. Congress, including "Politics or
L267	Principle?", which is about the filibuster. He is a former fellow of the Brookings
L268	Institute.
L269	Norm Ornstein is a name well known to every one of us here. He is a resident
L270	scholar of the American Enterprise Institute. He also serves as Co-Director of the
L271	Election Reform Project and is the author of many books about Congress, including "The
L272	Broken Branch." He writes a weekly column for Roll Call, is an election analyst for CBS
L273	News, and is counselor to the Continuity of Government Commission.
L274	Gentlemen, each of your statements will be read into the record, and if you
L275	could keep your testimony to the allotted time, which I am sure you will, that would be
L276	great.
L277	Professor Smith?
L278	STATEMENT OF STEVEN S. SMITH, DIRECTOR, THE MURRAY WEIDENBAUM CENTER OF
L279	THE ECONOMY, GOVERNMENT, AND PUBLIC POLICY, KATE M. GREGG PROFESSOR OF
L280	SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, WASHINGTON

UNIVERSITY, ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Bennett. This is a very important set of hearings. The Senate is, I think, at an important juncture in its history and the upshot of my testimony is that we actually have reached a point in the Senate that is qualitatively different than the Senate has been in at any time in its past and it is time to consider some changes, both in the rules and in how the parties and Senators behave.

My general argument is that one of the important roles of the Senate is to serve as a policy incubator, that is, for Senators to use their time and creativity to define and address the important problems of the country. But the Senate in the last ten years and especially in the last five years or so has reached a point where the Senate's most valuable resources, the time and creativity of its members, is undercut by how the Senate has come to operate.

As we have seen throughout the hearing and as the two of you know perfectly well, the more vigorous exploitation of minority rights and the majority response has had a very pervasive effect, and I think a negative effect, on how the Senate is operated. Here is what I see.

In recent Congresses with both Democratic and Republican minorities, very few major measures have been untouched by efforts to delay or prevent action. I have some tables at the end of my testimony that you can take a look at. The minority has engaged in more silence in response to majority requests for clearance of bills for consideration. There have been more frequent objections to majority party

unanimous consent requests to structure debate and amendments. There are more holds extended to more minor measures and nominations, something for an outsider very difficult to count, but plainly true. There are more delays of Senators, and sometimes, I think, deliberately minority party Senators to get to the floor to offer amendments. And even an increase in the number of minority party unanimous consent requests to try to restructure floor debate as they see fit.

Now, the minority's moves have motivated majority party leaders to leave nothing to chance. In kind of a tit for tat fashion, in kind of a parliamentary arms race fashion, over the years, the majority, indeed, has responded, just as we heard this morning from a variety of Senators on the Republican side. Beyond having a quick trigger on filing for cloture, Majority Leaders and bill managers of both parties have more frequently filled the amendment tree, more frequently used their own amendments to prevent other amendments from becoming the pending business, a tactic which became an especially sensitive matter just yesterday when the minority took advantage of the fact that a pending amendment prevents another amendment from being considered except by unanimous consent.

This has led to tightened unanimous consent agreements, including the use of 60-vote requirements for amendments, which is a relatively new development. And beyond the obvious things on the floor, it has moved Majority Leaders to take a closer look at non-conference mechanisms to avoid debatable conference motions. And on some sensitive matters, especially on appropriations bills, Majority Leaders have

avoided floor action altogether by facilitating the creation of omnibus bills in conference to limit the number of shots at the bills once they get to the floor.

Now, this is not the kind of Senate that I heard anyone here wanting in the future. This is a question of the power of the Senate. What kind of a Senate is it that fails, because of the desire to avoid floor delay and obstruction, what kind of a Senate is it that fails to even consider appropriations bills that are the foundation of the power of the purse of the Congress in dealing with the executive branch?

Now, of course, the minority has not remained idle. The minority's countermeasures include more objections to unanimous consent requests, frequently more resolutely opposing cloture on bills. There have been any number of instances in which a Senator in the minority has said, because I can't get my amendment up, I am going to vote against cloture. So in this context, procedural prerogatives intended to protect an open, deliberative, flexible process has, in fact, generated in practice a complicated process that is often rigid and procedure-bound.

Now, the best metaphor for this, I think, is actually a medical one. It is really a syndrome, kind of an obstruct and restrict syndrome, one in which well-justified procedural moves on each side accumulate and harm the institution.

Each party now begins with the working hypothesis that the other side will fully exploit its procedural options, and so it must fully deploy its without any evidence from the other side that it is using its procedural options to harm its interests. Now, this can hardly be argued to be the kind of Senate in which every Senator gets an opportunity to

fully explore new policy ideas. It is, in fact, a Senate that over the last decade or so has managed to radically reduce the incentives for individual Senators to take the time and to apply the creativity to address the nation's problems.

My second major point is that this is a role that the Senate should focus on.

We are a country with immense problems. Senators of both sides have argued for years that many of these problems have gone unaddressed. Part of it is in our larger system of government, the checks and balances, divided party control of the House and the Senate and the Presidency and so on, but a large part of it rests right here in the Senate.

The constitutional features of the Senate that encourage this, of course, were the longer terms, the overlapping terms, the continuity of the Senate. All of this gave the Senate a special place for the application of creativity in addressing new ideas, building a national constituency for new ideas, and so on. Much of that has now been undercut by the system we have.

I favor a system where we reach a new balance. It is unfortunate, but we can't reverse history. We can't really expect the parties to unilaterally disarm. I think it is up to the Senate to figure out a few new ways to limit debate and at the same time protect minority rights that are currently being threatened by this awful obstruct and restrict syndrome.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith submitted for the record]

Mr. Smith. Thank you, Professor Smith.

1366 Mr. Ornstein?

STATEMENT OF NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. Ornstein. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. It is a particular pleasure to testify in front of you and in front of this committee, which is filled with people who really do care about the Senate and its role in the American democratic process. I am particularly grateful that it does not require a motion to proceed for me to move on to my testimony or we might be here all week.

Let me start by saying that I am really not among those who want to end Rule

22. I don't want the Senate to become like the House. I actually think that the

Senate has become more like the House, in part because so many House members,

especially the Class of 1994 and classes that have followed, have gravitated over here

and have brought some of the norms of a harshly partisan, deeply divided, and perhaps

ultra-efficient House into the Senate DNA a little bit more than they should have.

As I listened to the testimony and as I watched the testimony from the last hearing--by the way, I want to commend the committee, more than any other, the ability for somebody to be able to go to your website and watch what you do and see, by the way, how carefully it is done is just a Godsend for those of us who follow Congress.

But I have had some sympathy with both sides in this. We do have a chicken and egg problem, as Steve has said. This is a problem for the majority and the minority

in a lot of ways, and it is a problem of the culture. And it is, as Senator Byrd so
eloquently said, in some respects a problem of the larger political culture, the outside
moving and infecting the inside, and some of that outside culture is particularly
obnoxious at this particular point. But we can't change the culture entirely inside the
Senate and we need to also focus to some degree on the rules. And hopefully, we can
find ways to change the norms and the rules together.

I am not going to spend a lot of time because of the substance of this hearing on specific recommendations, although I am very happy, and both of us, along with other scholars who follow this process closely, have lots of ideas about specific things to do.

Chairman Schumer. I would just ask, either of our witnesses here, if they would like to offer suggestion. But, we are not up to specific suggestions yet.

Mr. Ornstein. Yes.

But I want to mention--

Chairman Schumer. But if you would, it would be really helpful to us if you want to submit in writing some specific suggestions and we would add them to the record. Then we might have you back again to ask questions about your suggestions, if that would be okay.

Mr. Ornstein. I think both of us would be delighted to do so--

Chairman Schumer. Thank you.

Mr. Ornstein. --and, of course, to work with the committee in any way that we can to help to move this process forward.

I want to talk about a couple of elements that I think are a focal point of this hearing which really are what all this has done to the fabric of governance in America.

I had great sympathy for Senator Alexander when he was held--his nomination for Secretary of Education was held by Senator Metzenbaum. Steve Smith turned to me at that particular moment and said, well, we have 100 Metzenbaums now. And one of the problems is that nominations that are held for three months, or in many cases six months, nine months, a year, or more, many leaving nominees to twist in the wind, have an enormous human cost for those individuals. I have sympathy for Senator Roberts, having a really serious concern and wanting to get the attention of the executive branch and held up Congressman McHugh, which was painful to Congressman McHugh.

But Congressman McHugh was already here in Washington, had a job, had a house. Imagine people who make a commitment to public service and are living outside the city, as most of them do, thankfully, and we leave them twisting in the wind. I think individual Senators often do not recognize the human cost to people. They can't move their families. They can't time school years. We are losing a lot of good people, and at the same time, we are finding agencies, critical agencies, that are left headless or without the main people who are designed to run things, career civil servants waiting for direction and can't get them.

I can tell you from what I have heard from local officials out in the country that one of the main problems we had in getting the stimulus package actually out there to

have a more immediate and vibrant effect on the economy was that you had to expedite action through waivers of things like Environmental Impact Statements, or to move things more quickly than the normal process, and they couldn't do it because the officials were not in place.

At the same time, one of the great difficulties that we have is it is wonderful to have a tradition of unlimited debate and unlimited amendments. We are not in the 19th century. There is a huge agenda. Whether you like some elements of that agenda or not, the regular business of having authorizations done for programs and agencies, of having appropriations, is a necessary component for good governance. Whether you are a big government liberal or a small government conservative, the government that we have to protect the integrity of the country, to protect our citizens, ought to be run effectively and well.

We have gone for years in many cases without programs being authorized, and that hurts the implementation of those programs. Talk to any civil servant or government official trying to administer a program when you don't know what your appropriation is going to be, or you have to operate for months on a continuing resolution and then all of a sudden get a flood of money coming in. It is no way to run a government. Now, that is not entirely attributable to the way that the Senate is operating, but in fact, we have been forced because of the way the system has become clogged to move away from the regular order in too many ways.

The human cost is there for judges, as well. I must say, Senator Bennett, you

are absolutely right that we did not have a tradition of filibustering nominees, although we did have filibusters before, including Justice Fortas. But not to get into that argument, what did change long before we had a discussion of filibusters of judicial nominees was an increasing practice of holding up nominations to try and keep slots open from one administration to the next, and that was a dramatic change from what we had had before.

And we have large numbers of judicial nominees, Elena Kagan among them, who sat for long periods of time when there were no objections to their individual qualifications--this was true for both parties--many of whom ultimately withdrew. Just as for executive branch officials, if you are in a law firm or in a university and you are waiting to take a leave or trying to leave your firm, you are left in limbo. It is no way to run things.

Frankly, I can make a better case for filibustering lifetime appointments than I can for filibustering temporary appointments for any period of time, but in either case, we are not considering the human cost.

There are ways to deal with these things, and the hold itself and the way it has exploded as a tactic for holding up hundreds and hundreds, not individual nominees, many of whom--most of whom now are not held up because of their qualifications or concerns but as hostages, and some for the purpose of killing them, can be changed.

The notion of filibusters on motions to proceed moves away from any argument about trying to cut off debate because, in fact, that is an attempt itself to cut off debate. And

if we took Senator Schumer's chart and parsed it out, you would find an increasing number of the cloture motions are on motions to proceed.

And finally, let me say, if we talk about the numbers, one very simple change to consider, remember in 1975 we went from two-thirds of the Senate--or, excuse me, from two-thirds of the Senate present and voting to three-fifths of the Senate--would be to simply move to three-fifths of the Senate present and voting. One of the real problems you have got now is if somebody is sick, as we saw with Senator Byrd, one individual can create an enormous roadblock if you have a rigid number. So there is a way to preserve the number 60 but to create a little bit more flexibility. And then there are other ways to make sure that we can expedite action while preserving the right of a minority and the right of other members to offer amendments and have debate.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ornstein submitted for the record]

Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Ornstein. I thank both our witnesses for excellent testimony.

We are running much later than we thought, but I do have one question. I have a whole lot of questions. I am going to submit some in writing.

The debate that some of us have been focusing on is - is it the Constitution that trumps the rule in Rule 22? But Senator Nickles had something interesting to say, and Senator Bennett and I were chatting here. It really is a 'chicken and egg', I think, as I think it was you, Professor Smith, said. We say, the majority Democrats at this

moment say, you are filibustering to delay. The minority Republicans say, we are filibustering because you won't let us offer amendments.

And, it was always sort of in my mind a tradeoff, having moved from the House to the Senate, that I thought, 'well, that is the tradeoff.' The majority sets the agenda and the minority gets to offer amendments, not just to that agenda but other things. It seemed to me sort of a balanced system. In a sense, when I moved from the House to the Senate, I said it is harder in the Senate because you have to vote on all kinds of things, and you don't have the Rules Committee when you are in the majority. I have served minority House, majority House, minority Senate, majority Senate. Only one is really bad.

[Laughter.]

Chairman Schumer. So there was that sort of balance, and it is sort of taken out of the way. Now, I could argue with Senator Bennett that holds on nominees are not intended to prevent debate and amendment but just intended to be dilatory.

Motions to proceed are somewhat different.

But my question, and I will only ask one here, although I am interested in your views, and I will ask you in writing, on the Constitution versus Rule 22, is this. Do you think there is some hope? Senator Nickles said, don't change the rules. Try to come to some bipartisan agreement, you know, agreement between the caucuses, I think he called it.

Do you think that is possible in this day and age, where the majority would say to

the minority, we are going to ensure your right to offer several amendments, or a bunch of amendments, not to be dilatory, not to take over. It would be unfair, it seems to me, for the minority to spend more time on their amendments that are not relevant to the bill than the majority spends on the bill itself. That would take away the power to set the agenda. But we will guarantee you your right to offer some non-germane amendments, but in return, you don't slow things down unnecessarily.

I don't know, maybe that tradeoff could work, especially given the fact that each of us realizes we may be on the other side, majority-minority, several times in our career, as has happened to me. So that is my only question. I would ask each witness to give an answer, and then we will call on Senator Bennett and let people go.

Mr. Smith. Senator Schumer, I certainly favor some kind of a mixed package that, on the one hand, limits debate at least on some motions, the motion to proceed. I would like to see some limits on motions to go to conference. I would even like to see limits on debate on amendments, which would have the effect of guaranteeing the minority a vote on an amendment that is taken up on the floor. And in exchange for that, some real guarantees for the minority to offer amendments and to debate those amendments and the bill.

Now, whether that is a tradeoff that would be acceptable to the minority, I am actually very dubious about that. If some kind of a tradeoff like that is not possible, then we do fall back on the question of how the majority can change the rules without making the case that the Constitution allows it to do so by a simple majority.

Mr. Ornstein. I would love to see this handled informally. I have sympathy for the minority. I must say, though, one problem that I have seen and I mention in my testimony, we have had a number of bills that ended up passing unanimously or near unanimously that had to go through filibusters on the motions to proceed and on the bills themselves and took days and days. I mention a nomination for a court of appeals where this poor woman was held twisting in the wind for months and months and then ultimately got through on a near-unanimous vote.

The only reason for doing that--this is not about the concerns about having an opportunity to debate. This is to stretch out an agenda. And so you have got to come to an agreement, and whether that agreement can be reached, I don't know.

More generally, I just believe that people who make the sacrifice for public service deserve at some point a vote, and in almost every instance, it ought to be an up or down vote. And so I don't think you can achieve that without some change in the rules that takes nominations to a different level, and it seems to me that there may be some opportunity there for a bipartisan agreement. You are going to have to do some mix of informal negotiations between leaders and among members, and I hope some bipartisan consensus on a modest package of rules changes, but I don't see any other way out.

Chairman Schumer. Obviously, if we had bipartisan consensus, we wouldn't have to debate whether we need 67, 60, or a majority.

1554 Mr. Ornstein. Yes.

Chairman Schumer. Senator Bennett?

Senator Bennett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to both of you for your patience today and your thoughtful consideration.

Mr. Ornstein, I would make just one comment about the objection to the motion to proceed. I will not speak for Senator McConnell, but I have been at the leadership tables where the decisions are made as to whether or not we will object to a motion to proceed, and in every instance, there is a significant negotiation that takes place where this becomes ultimately his ultimate weapon in his conversations with Senator Reid. It is not entered into lightly. Okay, Senator Reid, we will give you the motion to proceed if we can have your word that the following things will happen. And again, I am not privy to any of the conversations, only as they get reported in the leadership table, and I am going to be very careful not to violate any confidentiality that comes out of that.

It is my guess, I will put it that way, that there are circumstances where Senator Reid would like to accommodate Senator McConnell but feels he cannot because of the reaction he would get within his conference. And it is my guess that there are times when Senator McConnell would like to be more accommodating to Senator Reid but cannot because to do so would arise the ire of the Republican Conference.

I remember Senator Dole saying to me, "I am supposed to be the leader around here," and this was when we were in the minority, and, he said, "I have got 42 independent contractors I have to deal with," every one of which has the right to object to a unanimous consent agreement and without giving any hint of circumstances or

context. I have seen Senator McConnell be frustrated in a very legitimate kind of action that he would like to proceed with, frustrated by a single Senator who refused to give a unanimous consent agreement. And I have seen Senator Reid in the same circumstance, where a single Senator on his side has caused Senator Reid to, perhaps injudiciously, but I will protect him, make some less than flattering comments about a member of his own conference, as we then end up in the situation where we do.

The only other comment I would make, I think the--and I do lay this at Tom

Daschle's door because he is the first one I saw who used it--the inability to appoint

conferees by unanimous consent was always done. The leader picked the name. The

unanimous consent agreement was made. The conferees were appointed. And

Senator Daschle was the first one that I saw who said, no, we will not allow you to

appoint conferees. We will allow you to pass the bill. Indeed, we will vote for it so

we get credit with our constituents as being in favor of it. But we will not allow the bill

to ever survive because we won't allow you to appoint conferees. And that gives the

minority power to dictate the results of the conference.

And one of the things that has disturbed me, Mr. Chairman, as much as all of the filibusters and the holds, is that we are not having conferences anymore.

Chairman Schumer. That is true. That is true.

Senator Bennett. When I first came here, it was, okay, we are going to write this bill in conference. We understand we have got to work with the House. We have got to work this out. We will write the bill in conference, and it goes through.

L597	Okay, take that amendment in order to get to conference. And increasingly, we are
L598	not having any conference.
L599	So I say somewhat facetiously, the Senate is superbly structured to deal with the
L600	problems of the 19th century and we need to, whether it is done with precedent or
L601	whether it is done with rules changes or whether it is done with greater comity within
L602	the various conferences, we do have a problem.
L603	That being said, I reserve the right to object to anything you want to do
L604	[Laughter.]
L605	Senator Bennettwith respect to changing the rules. Thank you.
L606	Chairman Schumer. And on that happy note
L607	[Laughter.]
L608	Chairman Schumer. This was a great hearing. My only wish is that every one
L609	of our colleagues could have witnessed it, and maybe they will look at parts of it. It
L610	really has helped shed light on the big problems we all agree we face, even if we can't
L611	yet agree on solutions.
L612	I thank the witnesses here
L613	Mr. Ornstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
L614	Chairman Schumerand the earlier witnesses. I thank my fine colleague,
L615	Senator Bennett.
L616	The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]